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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
CON STITUTIO NAL LAW-DISCRIMINATION -STATE JUDICIARY
PRECLUDED FROM ENFORCING A CRIMINAL TRESPASS PURSUANT TO
A RESTAURATEUR'S DISCRIMINATORY REFUSAL To SERVE AND THE
PATRON'S REFUSAL To LEAVE.
State v. Brown (Del. 1963)
Defendant, a Negro, entered a privately owned establishment with
separate hotel and restaurant facilities and requested the service of food.
The proprietor, relying on a Delaware statute,' asked the defendant to
leave after denying him service solely because of his race. Upon his refusal
to leave, the proprietor obtained a warrant for his arrest for violating
the criminal trespass statute.2 Defendant was arrested by the police, but
the charge was dismissed by a municipal court . Upon petition of the
parties, the superior court certified to the Delaware Supreme Court the
question of whether the proprietor of a place of public accommodation
violates the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to serve a patron because
of race pursuant to state statute. The court held that the proprietor of a
private place of public accommodation has the right to refuse service to a
Negro on a racial basis, but that he cannot have the Negro convicted
for the trespass. State v. Brown . ........ Del .......... , 195 A.2d 379 (1963).
It is well settled that a private act of discrimination is not forbidden
by the Fourteenth Amendment.4 This amendment has been held to apply
only to state action and in no way impedes the rights of individuals to
act as they choose. Private conduct abridging individual rights does no
violence to the equal protection clause unless to some significant extent
the state, in any of its manifestations, is involved. The line of prohibited
state conduct may be crossed by executive, 5 legislative,6 administrative, 7
or judicial action.8 With these principles in mind the Delaware Supreme
Court had to decide whether there was prohibited state action in the statute
recognizing the right to discriminate, in the act of the proprietor in
discriminating, or in the possible conviction under these circumstances.
The right of a private entrepreneur to select the persons he will serve
and to make such selection by any criterion he chooses, including color,
1. DEL. CoDt ANN. tit. 24, § 1501 (1953):
No keeper of an inn, tavern, hotel, or restaurant, or other place of public
entertainment or refreshment of travelers, guests, or customers shall be obliged,
by law, to furnish entertainment or refreshment to persons whose reception or
entertainment by him would be offensive to the major part of his customers, and
would injure his business.
2. DSL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 871 (1953).
3. State v. Brown, Wilmington, Del., Munic. Ct., No. 483, May Term, 1963.
4. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883).
5. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 83 S.Ct. 1122 (1963) ; Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473 (1961) ; Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945);
see also 9 VILL. L. Rv. 129 (1963).
6. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 83 S.Ct. 1119 (1963); Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60, 38 S.Ct. 16 (1917).
7. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856 (1961).
8. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031 (1953).
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has been repeatedly recognized by the courts of this nation.9 The heavy
weight of judicial opinion is that the proprietor of a restaurant did not
have a duty to serve everyone who presented himself for service.10 A
restaurateur had the right to select his patrons even by a discriminatory
standard. In the instant case, however, the proprietor was acting pur-
suant to an express statute. Herein lies an argument for unlawful state
legislative action.
The same statute was subject to the scrutiny of the Supreme Court
of the United States in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority" and
was held valid in spite of the equal protection clause. It may be implied
from the decision that, if there were a valid preexisting common law rule
allowing restaurant owners to refuse service to anyone, the mere fact that
this rule has been restated in a statute does not introduce state action
into the discrimination. Though there was some dispute about how the
Delaware court had interpreted the statute, it may be inferred that if
this statute were a codification of valid common law, it could not be the
basis of state action as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 2 In the
instant decision, the Delaware court clearly indicated that the statute does
not denote a public policy favoring a discriminatory classification, but
merely codifies the common law. The court therefore held that the statute
was not violative of the equal protection clause. This appears in line
with the Burton decision.
Justice Wolcott, in his concurring opinion charges the prohibited
legislative action. His assertion was based on the facts that the legislature
has acted and that relying on this act, the proprietor discriminated upon
racial grounds. However, this position seems untenable since the statute
is non-discriminatory on its face. A reading of the statute readily discloses
that it makes no reference to any class, race or group, nor does it confer
any more rights on Caucasians than are conferred on Negroes. This is
not a law that seeks to undercut the rights of any racial group. To the
contrary, this is a law that is merely a legislative recognition of the
common law rights accorded to the owners of property which find wide-
spread acceptance throughout the United States.13 The mere fact that
a party used the statute to discriminate does not make the statute uncon-
stitutional if the statute in itself is non-discriminatory.
9. Fletcher v. Coney Island, 100 Ohio App. 259, 136 N.E.2d 344 (1955) ; TerrellWells Swimming Pool v. Rodriguez, 182 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); De La
Ysla v. Publix Theatres Corp., 82 Utah 598, 26 P.2d 818 (1933).
10. Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959);Slack v. Atlantic White Tower Sys., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1960); Alpaugh
v. Wolverton, 184 Va. 943, 36 S.E.2d 906 (1946).
11. 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856 (1961).
12. Id. at 727-28, 81 S.Ct. 862-64 (see Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion
and Justices Harlan, Whittaker and Frankfurter's dissents). Although this particular
issue was not discussed by the majority, it can be inferred from Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's dissent that the court would not have found state action from the mere
codification of the common law. Id. at 863-64, 81 S.Ct. at 728.
13. See cases cited in notes 9 & 10 supra.
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Defendant next attempted to link the state with the restaurateur by
the fact that the state issued a license to the restaurant. The issue of
whether discrimination by a licensee of the state is state action has been
before the federal courts in the past.t4 The theory has been uniformly
rejected on the ground that the licensing requirement is merely to insure
minimum health standards in restaurants for the protection of the com-
munity, and is not an attempt to control the management of the business
or to dictate its policies. This distinction appears to be valid, for to hold
that all licensees are state instrumentalities subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment would almost completely erode any distinction between private
and public action and undermines the teachings of the Civil Rights Cases.15
With the dismissal of this issue, the court was faced with deciding
perhaps the most difficult issue of the case: whether at the request of
a private owner of a public accommodation, the state may convict as a
trespasser one who refuses to leave after being denied service because
of his race. This particular question has never been answered by the
Supreme Court of the United States, although the enforcement by the
judiciary of a private discrimination had been held void in Shelley v.
Kraemer.16 The court in that landmark case held that the action of
state courts in enforcing restrictive agreements which exclude persons of
designated race or color from the occupancy of real property is unconsti-
tutional. The restrictive agreements standing alone did not violate any
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment since they were private
discriminations, however it was held that in enforcing the restrictive
covenant the state had denied a Negro the equal protection of the law.
Drawing an analogy from this to the instant case, the refusal to serve would
not be unconstitutional, but the judicial enforcement of the trespass would
be. This analogy appears logical, but raises the problem of whether the doc-
trine of Shelley v. Kraemer is broad enough to cover the instant situation.
The Delaware court based its holding on Shelley, justifying the
extension of that doctrine on Turner v. City of Memphis.17 The court
felt that, just as in the latter case where it was held that the state could
not enact a statute which supported racial discrimination, the present court
could not apply a statute which results in fostering racial discrimination.
The court then stated that the Turner decision contravenes the previous
decisions that have upheld trespass convictions.' 8 However, using Turner
14. Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959)
Slack v. Atlantic White Tower Sys., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1960). See also
Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, Inc., 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697 (1947);
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761, 68 S.Ct. 63 (1947).
15. 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883). These cases held that private discrimination
is not unlawful under the Fourteenth Amendment. But see Harlan, J., dissenting in the
Civil Rights Cases, id. at 27, 3 S.Ct. at 33 and Douglas, J., concurring in Lombard v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 274, 83 S.Ct. 1122, 1125.
16. 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
17. 369 U.S. 350, 82 S.Ct. 805 (1962).
18. Griffin v. State, 225 Md. 422, 171 A.2d 717 (1961); State v. Clyburn, 247
N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958); Randolph v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 661, 119
S.E.2d 817 (1961). See also Griffin v. Collins, 187 F. Supp. 149 (D. Md. 1960).
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as the basis of an extention of Shelley is unsound. Turner dealt with an
injunction against a party operating eating and rest room facilities at a
municipal airport on a racially segregated basis and did not involve judicial
enforcement of a private discrimination. Whether the instant result is
justified based on Shelley alone is the question that must be answered.
It could be argued under Shelley that whenever there is a private
discrimination, and the state makes it efficacious through the judicial
machinery, the state is a partner in the discrimination. Following this
premise, it would seem that if there were a discriminatory disposition under
a will which the state judiciary enforces, there would be unlawful state
action. Apparently, however, Shelley does not extend this far. In the case of
In re Girard College Trusteeship,19 where certiorari to the Supreme Court
was denied, a private testamentary discrimination was enforced by a state
court. Though denial of certiorari lends no greater weight to any case,
the case suggests that different types of discrimination will be accorded
different treatment by the courts. On this set of facts and in the absence of
a liberalizing interpretation of Shelley by the Supreme Court, the Pennsyl-
vania court was unwilling to extend Shelley.
Other courts have been faced with this exact problem and have not
satisfactorily resolved the issue. These courts either fail to discuss the
issue, 0° or state positively that there is not state action,21 or ignore the
Shelley ramifications.22 Unfortunately these courts fail to give substantial
reasons for their failure to apply or extend the Shelley rule. It should be
noted, however, that this failure is not entirely the fault of these courts
because the extent of Shelley is more or less speculative at the present.
It has been suggested that under the Shelley principle judicial state
action exists only if ". . . the state assists a private person in seeing to it
that others behave in a fashion which the state cannot itself have ordained." 23
Using this theory, court help would be state action if the courts are to
coerce an unwilling party into discrimination, but it would not be unlawful
if a private individual engages the courts to protect his own conduct. In
the Shelley case, since the seller was willing to sell his property, discrimi-
nation was not effected until the courts enforced the restrictive covenant.
The seller did not want to discriminate, and in the absence of court
enforcement there would have been no discrimination. In effect, the court
would be forcing one to discriminate when he was unwilling to do so.
Using this analysis for the instant case where there was no unwilling
discrimination, the court could enforce the trespass, because there would
be no judicial compulsion of discrimination. The court would merely be
recognizing the individual's right to discriminate and protecting the right
19. 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958), cert. denied sub nom., Pennsylvania v.
Board of Directors of City Trusts, 357 U.S. 570, 78 S.Ct. 1383 (1958).
20. State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958).
21. Drews v. State, 224 Md. 186, 167 A.2d 341 (1961).
22. Griffin v. Collins, 187 F. Supp. 149 (D. Md. 1960).
23. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity, 108 U. PA. L. Rev. 1,
13 (1959).
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss3/12
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
to use his property as he sees fit.24 This analysis is plausible, although
nowhere in the Shelley decision does the Court indicate this limited view.
Another view of interpreting the extent of Shelley and Girard is that
the state should not be restrained from using judicial enforcement where
it cannot prevent a particular private action or discrimination because to
do so would deprive the discriminator of due 1rocess of law.25 In other
words, if the state legislature could not constitutionally abolish the private
right to discriminate, there should be no constitutional bar to enforcing the
right. This theory assumes that under the Shelley facts the state could
outlaw the discriminatory practice, while in Girard they could not. Applying
this theory to the present case, if the legislature of Delaware could prohibit
discrimination by a restaurateur, judicial enforcement of the proprietor's
discrimination would be violative of Shelley, and the holding of the instant
case would be justified.26 However, it is submitted that a finding of state
action by judicial enforcement should be based upon what the state does,
not what it fails to do. Even if the state could prohibit private discrimina-
tion, it is not constitutionally compelled to do so. It can allow the
entrepreneur to discriminate, and it would seem illogical to prevent the
state courts from enforcing the individual's right. If the reverse were true,
any discrimination within the power of the state to prevent would be state
action and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This precise issue has been repeatedly avoided by the Supreme Court.2 7
The rule of Shelley v. Kraemer has never been extended by that Court to
cover the situation involved in the instant case. But in view of the per-
sistent efforts of so many to circumvent the policy of the Court to eliminate
discrimination, it could not be said with certainty that the Court would
not extend the rule if this case reached it. In the present state of the law,
however, it does not appear that the Delaware Supreme Court was required
to reach this decision. It is, of course, free to interpret the United States
Constitution in any way it sees fit as long as its interpretation does not
violate any person's constitutional rights. Certainly the decision in the
instant case violates no one's rights, and it may be, if the efforts to' per-
24. See United States Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530, 531, 275 P.2d 860.
863 (1954), where it was stated that "while one may personally and loudly condemn
a species of 'intolerance' as socially outrageous, a court on the other hand must guard
against being judicially intolerant of such an 'intolerance,' unless the court can say the
act of intolerance is in a form not sanctioned by the law."
25. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes For a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
Rev. 473, 491 (1962).
26. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506, 66 S.Ct. 276, 278 (1946). "The
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in
general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the . . . constitutional rights
of those who use it." (dictum).
27. See Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 81 S.Ct. 182 (1960) (decided under
the commerce clause) ; Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 82 S.Ct. 248 (1961)(dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence against petitioners) ; Peterson v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 83 S.Ct. 1119 (1963) (found state action created by a
compulsory segregation statute) ; Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 83 S.Ct. 1122
(1963) (police speeches commanding segregation in restaurant was unlawful state
action) ; 9 VILL. L. Rev. 129 (1963).
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